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Abstract
We present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary
incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others’ behavior. In each session and round, sixteen subjects make
a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they estimate the choices of a randomly selected subgroup.
For half of the rounds we provide information about other subjects’ choices. There we ﬁnd no false consensus
effect. At an aggregate level, subjects signiﬁcantly underweight rather than overweight their choices. When we do
not provide information, the presence of a false consensus effect cannot be detected.
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1. Introduction
The ‘false consensus effect’ has frequently been reported in social psychological research.
The term was ﬁrst used by Ross et al. (1977). Mullen et al. (1985) report 115 studies which
show a false consensus effect. It has also been observed in several experiments conducted
by economists, although these were not designed to test for this effect.1 Most of the studies
employed a deﬁnition similar to that used by Mullen et al. (1985):
False consensus refers to an egocentric bias that occurs when people estimate consensus
for their own behaviors. Speciﬁcally, the false consensus hypothesis holds that people
who engage in a given behavior will estimate that behavior to be more common than it
is estimated to be by people who engage in alternative behaviors.2
Dawes (1989, 1990) realized that this type of deﬁnition does not justify the label ‘false’.
He argues that it is perfectly rational to use the information about one’s own decision in the242 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL
same way as the information about any other randomly selected sample of size one. The
effect is only false if too much weight is assigned to one’s own decision. We will therefore
refer to the effect as deﬁned above as a consensus effect and use the following deﬁnition of
a false consensus effect which is both stricter and more appropriate:
A (truly) false consensus effect is considered to be present if people, when forming
expectationsconcerningotherpeople’sdecisions,weighttheirowndecisionmoreheavily
than that of a randomly selected person from the same population.
Incontrasttothedeﬁnitioncitedﬁrstthisimpliesthatafalseconsensuseffectcanbecon-
sidered as a bias in a Bayesian framework. A consistent bias of expectations in the direction
of the own decision or preferences would have impact on economic interaction whenever
decisions are inﬂuenced by expectations. It would improve our ability to predict human
behavior greatly if we could discover systematic deviations from rational expectations, like
the false consensus effect, and if we could quantify them.3 Whether the false consensus
effect can be shown to be present even in terms of the stricter deﬁnition is therefore of
interest to economists.4
A reevaluation of several studies using the strict and appropriate deﬁnition has shown
that most of the studies did not ﬁnd such a (truly) false consensus effect, but that they quite
often found an effect in the opposite direction (see Dawes, 1990). Sherman et al. (1984)
ﬁnd a (truly) false consensus effect only when the self-image is threatened. Krueger and





relative to information about other people’s decisions. A possible approach to evaluate
the falsity of the effect is to assume a uniform prior belief about possible decisions and
then compare the posterior belief actually expressed to what would be obtained by rational
Bayesian updating using a sample of size one (see Dawes, 1989, for details). However, we
considertheassumptionofauniformpriorbeliefinthiscontextratherarbitraryandnotreally
justiﬁed. In addition, if overweighting of the available information is detected according to
this criterion, it cannot be decided whether it is overweighted because it concerns the own
decision.
Hence we set out to conduct an experiment which, without needing to use unjustiﬁable
assumptions or sophisticated statistical methods, allows a simple test to be made to see if
knowledge about the own decision is weighted more heavily than information about other
people’s decisions which we took from the same population whose behavior was to be
estimated later.
Our experiment avoids further shortcomings of previous experiments. From the per-
spective of an experimental economist, most social psychological experiments on the false
consensus effect are unsatisfactory for methodological reasons. This is primarily due to the
fact that no incentives for revealing the true beliefs are provided. Our study (like that of
Offermanetal.,1996,whoexaminethepresenceofafalseconsensuseffectinapublicgood
experiment) differs by providing clear (monetary) incentives for revealing the true beliefs.THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 243
The relevance of incentives in this context is demonstrated by Offerman et al. (1996). In a
post-experiment questionnaire 50% of their subjects stated that they would have answered
differently if no incentives had been provided.
Furthermore, in many of the social psychological experiments where information about
other people’s decisions is provided, this information is rigged and the subjects are clearly
deceived (e.g. Sherman et al., 1984; Alicke and Largo, 1995). Apart from general concerns
about this practice (see Camerer, 1996, for a general discussion), it is quite obvious that, in
some studies (Krueger and Clement, 1994; Alicke and Largo, 1995), subjects might have
become suspicious about this information and thus might have discarded it. In the present
study subjects were not deceived.
16 rounds were played in each session of the present experiment. In each round subjects
ﬁrst had to choose between two options and then estimate how some of the other subjects
in the same session had chosen. They were informed before the estimation step about the
ﬁrst step choices of the remaining subjects in half of the rounds. Monetary incentives for
true revelation of both preferences and beliefs were provided, since payoffs were based on
the number of correct estimates and transformed through the ﬁrst step choices of half of the
rounds. (See the following section for details.)
We found a clear consensus effect both when we provided information and when we did
not. Where we provided information about other subjects’ decisions, the information was
clearly used. Although subjects assigned some positive weight to their own decision when
estimating that of other subjects, this weight was lower than that assigned to the decisions
they were informed about. Hence the consensus effect we found was not a false consensus
effect.Intheroundswherewedidnotproviderepresentativeinformationtestingfora(truly)
false consensus effect is problematic, since the effect of the own decision on the estimation
cannot be compared with the effect of representative information simply because there isn’t
any.
In the next section we describe the experimental design. Section 3 contains the experi-
mental results, followed by the conclusion.
2. Experimental design
In each of the six experimental sessions 16 subjects played 16 rounds simultaneously on a
computer network.5 Each round consisted of three steps. In the ﬁrst step each subject chose
betweentwooptionsofanitem(Decision1).Oneitem,forexample,wasthequestion:“What
do you eat more frequently, oranges or bananas?” Another allowed the subjects to donate
DM 1,- to the non-government organization “amnesty international”. (See Appendix C for
the complete list.) The second step began with the random assignment of four (different)
subjects to each individual subject. In half of the rounds subjects were then informed about
these four subjects’ Decisions 1 without identifying them. For the other rounds subjects
received no information. The task in the third step was to estimate the remaining eleven
subjects’ Decisions 1 (this is called Decision 2). Subjects were informed that the random
matchingwasconductedindependentlyforeachsubjectandforeachround.Thisprocedure
ensured that the information subjects were provided with was from the same population
as the subjects whose decisions they were to estimate. No feedback about the success in244 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL
Table 1. Decision items 2£2£2 design. The numbers in brackets correspond to the order in which the items
were presented to the subjects. For details see Appendix C.
With Information Without Information
Morally Rich-Poor (6) Public Good (4)
Payoff Relevant Donation Chapel (15) Donation ai (9)
Relevant Morally Lottery (7) Payoff System (3)
Irrelevant Time Preference (10) Stamps (14)
Morally Free-Riding (2) Tax Evasion (5)
Not Payoff Relevant Waiter (16) Exam (12)
Relevant Morally Fruit (1) Writing (8)
Irrelevant Months (13) Elevator (11)
Decision 2 was provided before the experiment was completed so as to prevent learning
across items.
We implemented a 2£2£2 design with respect to the items (see Table 1). Items differ in
terms of payoff relevance, moral relevance, and whether the subjects received information
about the decisions of other participants.
The traditional way of measuring a false consensus effect compares estimates given in
Decision 2 by subjects who chose one option in Decision 1 to estimates given by subjects
who chose the other option in Decision 1 (see e.g. Ross et al., 1977). This does not re-
quire information. The more appropriate way is to compare the weights given to the own
Decision 1 and to that of a randomly chosen person in the same population when making
Decision 2. Thus we focus on the items with information in our analysis. The purpose of
the items without information is to check whether we can replicate with our design in the
absence of information the presence of a consensus effect found in previous studies. This
allows us to check whether possible deviations of our results from those of previous studies
result from any aspects of our design other than the information.
The distinction between morally relevant and irrelevant items gives us the opportunity to
investigate whether the (false) consensus effect has an ego-defensive function, for example:
“I do free-ride on public transport, but everybody does.” If this were the case, the effect
should be larger for morally relevant items than for morally irrelevant items. Sherman et al.
(1984) ﬁnd evidence for this hypothesis which is doubted by Alicke and Largo (1995).
An alternative explanation for the phenomenon usually labeled false consensus effect
could be that it is not a distortion of the expectations about other people’s decisions but
ratherresultsfromadesiretocomplywithperceivedsocialnorms.Inthepresentcontext,this
means that subjects adapt to assumed group behavior and norms as expressed in Decision 2
when making Decision 1. If this were the case, the effect should be smaller for the pay-off
relevant items because we provide clear monetary incentives for revealing subjects’ true
preferences.
Each cell in Table 1 contains two items. The numbers in brackets correspond to the order
in which the items were presented to the subjects. The payoffs to the subjects depended
primarily on the number of exact hits in Decision 2 in all rounds. They were also inﬂuenced
by the payoff relevant Decisions 1. Thus we provided clear monetary incentives for the trueTHE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 245
revelation of both the true estimates of other subjects’ decisions and of the own preferences
regarding Decision 1.
The protocol of the experiment as well as a translated version of the instructions can be





students at Humboldt-Universit¨ at. Each session took roughly one hour. The average payoff
was about DM 21.12.6
3.1. Analysis of items with information
ThemainresultsfortheitemswithinformationaresummarizedinTables2,3and4.Table2
deals with the presence of a consensus effect. Here, options in Decision 1 of each round are
labeled with A and B for simplicity.7 In the rest of this section we will refer to the subjects
who chose option A in Decision 1 as ‘A-subjects’ and the subjects who chose option B in
Decision 1 as ‘B-subjects’.
Asinmost“classical”studiesofthefalseconsensuseffect,inTable2wesimplycompare
the estimates of how many of eleven subjects chose option A given by the A-subjects with
those given by the B-subjects. We consider a consensus effect present if the ﬁrst estimate is
higher than the second, because this means that at least one of the groups estimates that the
consensus for the own decision is greater than is justiﬁed by the information given. Since
the information provided clearly matters (as will be explained below), only subjects who
received the same information can be compared.
The rows in Table 2 refer to the different items while the columns refer to the different
information sets that the subjects were provided with before Decision 2. Each cell con-
tains ﬁve entries. These are the number (aggregated over all ﬁve sessions) of A-subjects
(upper left) and B-subjects (upper right) who received the corresponding information set,
the average estimate of how many of eleven other subjects chose option A given by the
A-subjects (middle left) and by the B-subjects (middle right) and an indicator (bottom line)
which is C if a consensus effect is present and N otherwise. Consider for example the item




The entries in this cell show that 9 A-subjects and 18 B-subjects received the information
“one other subject chose A and three subjects chose B” and that their average estimates246 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL
Table 2. Test for consensus effect (own decision not considered as information).
Info Set 4A-0B 3A-1B 2A-2B 1A-3B 0A-4B
Decision A B A B A B A B A B
Item # #### # # ###
av av av av av av av av av av
C/N C/N C/N C/N C/N
Fruit 0 3 4 6 14 13 6 9 3 22
— 8.7 7.5 4.8 5.7 4.8 3.8 3.2 3.7 1.7
—C C C C
Free- 2 1 10 6 7 15 9 18 6 6
Riding 10.5 9.0 6.5 7.2 6.6 4.6 3.9 3.7 2.7 2.7
CN C C N
Rich- 0 02861 0 92 07 1 8
Poor — — 7.5 5.4 5.8 3.8 4.0 1.9 2.9 0.4
—C C C C
Lottery 0 0010 6 52 87 3 3
— — — 6.0 — 3.8 3.8 2.0 2.3 0.8
—— — C C
T i m e 1 03481 2 1 3 2 33 1 3
Preference 10.0 — 9.0 6.5 6.6 4.8 3.6 3.1 3.3 0.6
—C C C C
Months 1 35731 4 1 6 1 65 1 0
10.0 7.0 8.2 5.7 6.0 4.7 3.3 2.9 1.4 1.6
CC C C N
Donation 1 0 1 8 10 18 14 19 4 5
Chapel 11.0 — 8.0 5.8 5.0 4.6 3.7 3.0 3.5 0.2
—C C C C
Waiter 2 0 2 4 11 10 11 26 3 11
10.0 — 9.0 5.5 5.5 4.3 3.4 1.9 1.7 0.5
—C C C C
# Number of subjects chosing A (left) or B (right) for the item in the corresponding row and receiving the
information in the corresponding column
av Average estimate given by these subjects of how many of eleven subjects chose A for the corresponding
item
C Difference of estimates directly above corresponds to a consenus effect
N Difference of estimates directly above does not correspond to a consensus effectTHE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 247
Table 3. Test for (truly) false consensus effect (own decision considered as information).
Info Set 4A-1B 3A-2B 2A-3B 1A-4B
Decision A B A B A B A B
Item ##### ###
av av av av av av av av
F/N F/N F/N F/N
Fruit 4 3 14 6 6 13 3 9
7.5 8.7 5.7 4.8 3.8 4.8 3.7 3.2
NF NF
Free- 10 17691 56 1 8
Riding 6.5 9.0 6.6 7.2 3.9 4.6 2.7 3.7
NN NN
Rich- 206891 07 2 0
Poor 7.5 — 5.8 5.4 4.0 3.8 2.9 1.9
—F F F
Lottery 00015 67 2 8
— — — 6.0 3.8 3.8 2.3 2.0
—— N F
T i m e 3084 1 3 1 2 3 2 3
Preference 9.0 — 6.6 6.5 3.6 4.8 3.3 3.1
—F N F
Months 5337 1 6 1 45 1 6
8.2 7.0 6.0 5.7 3.3 4.7 1.4 2.9
FF NN
Donation 1 0 10 8 14 18 4 19
Chapel 8.0 — 5.0 5.8 3.7 4.6 3.5 3.0
—N N F
Waiter 2 0 11 4 11 10 3 26
9.0 — 5.5 5.5 3.4 4.3 1.7 1.9
—N N N
# Number of subjects chosing A (left) or B (right) for the item in the corresponding row and receiving the
information in the corresponding column (including their own decision)
av Average estimate given by these subjects of how many of eleven subjects chose A for the corresponding
item
F Difference of estimates directly above corresponds to a false consensus effect
N Difference of estimates directly above does not correspond to a false consensus effect248 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL





All 1.33 1.44 1.51 0.85 1.35 1.42
1.73 1.72 1.78 1.74 1.47 1.83
Morally relevant 1.39 0.36 1.77 1.29 2.00 1.19
1.75 2.06 1.87 1.64 1.39 1.66
Not morally rel. 1.28 2.32 1.36 0.43 0.54 1.57
1.73 1.49 1.85 1.84 1.56 1.95
Payoff relevant 1.66 1.15 1.97 1.13 1.62 2.25
1.78 1.69 1.56 2.13 1.41 1.90
Not payoff rel. 1.01 1.64 1.00 0.37 1.16 0.56
1.67 1.58 1.91 1.28 1.52 1.75
were 3.9 and 3.7, respectively. Thus a consensus effect is present which is indicated by the
C in the bottom line.
3.1.1. The effect of the information. Examining Table 2, the ﬁrst important thing we see
is a clear effect of the information given. The less A’s the subjects have in their information
sets, the lower their estimates of the number of subjects who chose option A. To see this,
consider for example the item “Waiter” and the A-subjects. Those subjects who had four
A’s in their information set on average estimated that 10 out of 11 subjects chose option A.
The estimates strictly decrease with the number of A’s in the information set to 9.0, 5.5,
3.4, and eventually to 1.7. This strict decrease in A estimates is violated only twice. Hence
the information clearly affects the estimates as expected.
The observations within each session are not independent and thus it is not possible to
apply straightforward tests to the aggregate data. An alternative method is to treat each
session as an independent observation and consider each item separately. For each session
and each item, we compare the number of A estimates for the subjects with the same own
decision but different informations sets. We simply count the results of all these compar-
isons and consider one session to be a hit for the corresponding item if the number of
positive differences is larger than the number of negative differences. This occurs under the
hypothesis that information has no inﬂuence with probability of less than 1
2 (since there is
a positive probability for a draw). Therefore the probability for a hit in all ﬁve sessions is
smaller than 1
32 D 3:125% and hence in this case the hypothesis can be rejected for the
item at the 5%-level. Using this procedure we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of the information for
six of the eight items (data not reported). For the remaining two items (“Fruit” and “Time
Preference”)therearefourhitsandtheeffectoftheinformationisthusinthesamedirection
but not signiﬁcant. Thus the overall effect of information on the estimates of other subjects’
behavior is well established.THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 249
3.1.2. The consensus effect. The second important observation that can be drawn from
Table 2 is the presence of a consensus effect. Of 32 cells where a comparison between the
estimates given by the A-subjects and the B-subjects could be made, 29 show an effect as
predicted by the consensus hypothesis. So there is a very clear indication of a consensus
effect in the present study.
As noted above, for strict statistical tests we have to treat the sessions as independent
observationsinsteadofthedecisions.Foranyitem,anysession,andanyinformationcondi-
tion, we compare the estimates given by the A-subjects with those given by the B-subjects.
We count a session as a hit for this item if for more information conditions the difference
between average estimates given by A-subjects and by B-subjects is positive rather than
negative. Under the hypothesis that the own decision is irrelevant to the estimate, i.e. the
absence of a consensus effect, the probability for a hit is less than 1
2 (since the probability
for a draw is positive). Corresponding to the analysis of the effect of information, there is
a signiﬁcant consensus effect at the 5%-level for an item if there is a hit in all ﬁve ses-
sions. Using this procedure we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant consensus effect for two items (“Fruit”
and “Waiter”). Of the remaining items four have four hits, one three hits and two draws and
one two hits, two draws and one miss (data not reported). If the probability for a draw is
taken into account there is a signiﬁcant consensus effect (5%-level) for two further items
(“Rich-Poor” and “Lottery”). Thus the evidence for the consensus effect is rather strong.8
The two conclusions drawn from Table 2 show that the estimates subjects give for the
choices of other subjects are clearly inﬂuenced by both the information they receive and
their own choice in Decision 1.
3.1.3. The false consensus effect. As was argued in the introduction, to examine the
false consensus effect it must be acknowledged that it is rational to use the information
concerning the own decision in the same way as the information about the decision of any
randomly selected subject from the same population. Hence, in the present study subjects
have the information about ﬁve subjects and not just four. Thus to decide whether there
is a false consensus effect we have to compare those subjects who made different choices
in Decision 1 but have the same total information which includes their own decision.A n
A-subject who received the information set “2A-2B” should expect more A choices than
a B-subject who received the same information. Therefore, a comparison should not be
made between these two subjects. Instead, the ﬁrst should be compared to the B-subjects
who received the information set “3A-1B” since both have the total information that three
subjects chose A and two chose B (“3A-2B”). The second should be compared to those
A-subjects who received the information set “1A-3B”. Only if in these comparisons the
A-subjects estimate a higher number of A choices than the B-subjects, would there be an
indication for the presence of a false consensus effect because this would imply that greater
weightwasassignedtotheowndecisionthantothatofthesubjectsaboutwhominformation
was given.
Table 3 is structured similarly to Table 2, it only has to be noted that the own decision
is included in the information set. For example, in the column marked “3A-2B” we note
for each item the number and average estimate of A-subjects who received the information
set “2A-2B” (upper and middle left) and the number and average estimate of B-subjects250 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL
who received the information set “3A-1B” (upper and middle right). If, among the subjects
with the same total information, the A-subjects on average estimated more A choices than
the B-subjects, we note an “F” for “false consensus present” in the bottom line of the cell,
otherwise an “N” for “no false consensus present”.
A brief inspection of Table 3 reveals that the situation is far less clear than that in Table
2. From 26 cells which allow a comparison, only eleven show a difference between average
estimates in line with the false consensus hypothesis, whereas 13 show a difference in the
opposite direction and two show no difference. Furthermore, among the eleven differences
corresponding to a false consensus, there are just two (“Fruit, 3A-2B” and “Rich-Poor,
1A-4B”) which are both substantial (i.e. > 0:5) and based on a large sample (i.e. at least
ﬁve subjects for both groups). On the other hand, there are ten substantial differences based
on large samples which are in the direction opposite to a false consensus effect.
Only for the item “Rich-Poor” the results from all information sets taken together are
more in favor of a false consensus effect than the opposite. The possible conclusion that a
false consensus effect might be more likely in the respective category (“morally relevant”
and “payoff relevant”) is not sustained, since the other item from the same category (“Do-
nation Chapel”) shows differences which are clearly contrary to this conclusion. Also, if
this conclusion were true, the items from the category “morally relevant” and “not payoff
relevant”(“Free-Riding”and“Waiter”)shouldexhibitafalseconsensusatleastasstrongly.
But they clearly do not, indeed, just the contrary.
Altogether there is stronger evidence opposite to a false consensus effect, i.e. subjects
weight the information about their own decision less than the information they have been
given about other subjects’ decisions.9
This conclusion is conﬁrmed by an analysis of the single items for each separate session.
As with the consensus effect, we count a session as a hit if for more information conditions
the difference between average estimates given by A-subjects and B-subjects is positive
rather than negative. For none of the items are there more than two (out of possible ﬁve)
hits. Altogether, there are eleven hits, eleven draws and 18 misses.
3.1.4. Regression analysis. The tendency against a false consensus effect is shown more
clearly by a regression analysis. Assume the simple linear regression model
E D ¯O C ° I C ±;
where E D # of A’s estimated, I D # of A’s in the information set and O D #o fA ’ si n
the own decision, i.e. O D 1 if the own decision is A and O D 0 otherwise. If subjects
weight their own decision like they do the information about other subjects’ decisions, then
¯ equals °. A false consensus effect corresponds to ¯>°and the underweighting of the
own decision to ¯<°. The estimated coefﬁcients are shown in Table 4.
Theﬁrstcolumncontainsthecoefﬁcientsfortheregressionoverallsessions,theﬁrstrow
those over all items. Over all sessions and all items, ¯ is clearly smaller than °. The same
holds for any single session over all items. Under the hypothesis that subjects overweight
their own decision relative to other subjects’ decisions (or that they weight it equally) the
probability of ¯<°is less than 1
2. Since the sessions are independent, the probability of
¯<°for all ﬁve sessions is smaller than 1
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rejected at a 5%-level. Hence we obtain a signiﬁcant effect opposite to a false consensus
effect.
The comparison of the morally relevant to the morally irrelevant items allows us to test
whether a potential false consensus effect has an ego-defensive function. Over all sessions
there is a tendency in the direction corresponding to this hypothesis, namely the relative
weight given to the own decision compared to the information is slightly higher for the
morally relevant items than for the morally irrelevant items. However, we do not consider
this to indicate that this hypothesis is correct because the weight given to the own decision
is still smaller than that given to the information.
The comparison between payoff relevant and not payoff relevant items allows us to
test the hypothesis that a possible false consensus effect is not based on the inﬂuence of
the own decision on the estimation of others’ decisions, but rather on an adaptation of
the own decision towards the estimated majority. If this were the case, then the effect
should be smaller for the payoff relevant items since the incentives for expressing the true
preferences work in the opposite direction. Hence the relative weight of the own decision
should be smaller for the payoff relevant decisions. We ﬁnd just the opposite. We only have
a speculative explanation for this result. These items are further from everyday experience
than the not payoff relevant items. This could result in a reasoning process which is based
less on general expectations and the given information and more on introspection.
Following our general argument that incentives matter, it may be argued that the analysis
should be restricted to the payoff relevant items. Then, over all sessions, the weight of the
own decision is still smaller than that of the given information. However, for the sessions
considered separately the picture is less clear. For three sessions (3, 5, and 6), the weight
of the own decision is slightly larger than that of the given information, for two (2 and 4) it
is smaller. Hence we have no signiﬁcant effect contrary to a false consensus effect in this
case, but also no hint in line with the false consensus effect.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the items that are not payoff relevant can be
included in the analysis since the subjects do not have to estimate what other subjects do
but what they state in the experiment. Hence, if subjects do not answer according to their
real preferences, they should also take into account the fact that other subjects might do
the same. Consequently, the task is essentially the same except that, apart from the possible
projection of own preferences, the possible projection of own honesty also matters. Our
interest is not primarily in the real preferences of the subjects but in their beliefs about what
others state in the same situation. We consider this a valid argument for the inclusion of the
not payoff relevant items in the analysis.
For all sessions the own decision clearly matters (¯>0) and hence the regression
supports the existence of a consensus effect in our experiment. This effect is more clearly
establishedthantheunderweightingoftheowndecision.Subjectsmoreconsistentlyweight
their own decision positively than that they underweight it.
3.2. Analysis of items without information
Table 5 shows the average estimates given for the items where we did not provide any
information about other subjects’ Decision 1. The columns show from left to right a key to
the content of the item, the number of A-subjects, their average estimate of A choices, the252 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL
Table 5. Estimates for items without representative information.
Item A # A av B # B av A av-Ba v
Payoff system 48 6.8 32 5.0 1.8
Public good 58 8.5 22 3.7 4.8
Tax evasion 42 7.2 38 4.4 2.8
Writing 29 5.7 51 4.2 1.5
Donation ai 41 7.6 39 3.8 3.8
Elevator 57 7.3 23 4.9 2.4
Exam 50 8.1 30 4.4 3.7
Stamps 57 9.1 23 6.0 3.1
number of B-subjects, their average estimate of A choices, and the difference between the
average estimates.
3.2.1. The consensus effect. For all items, the average estimate of A choices is higher
for the A-subjects than for the B-subjects. Thus there is a consensus effect at the aggregate
level.Thesameholdsforﬁveitems(“PublicGood”,“TaxEvasion”,“Donationai”,“Exam”,
“Stamps”) for each of the ﬁve sessions. Hence, by using a binomial test as in the preced-
ing sections, the hypothesis that the estimates are not biased towards the own choice can
be rejected at the 5%-level. For the remaining three items, average estimates given by the
A-subjectsarehigherinfouroutofﬁvesessionsandhencealsoclearlyinlinewithaconsen-
sus effect, though not signiﬁcantly. Thus we replicate the results of conventional research
on the false consensus effect. This implies that the non-existence of a false consensus effect
for the items with information is really due to the deﬁnition we apply and the information
but not to any other aspect of the design. In particular, incentives alone do not eliminate a
consensus effect.
3.2.2. The false consensus effect. The deﬁnition we gave above for the (truly) false
consensus effect requires that the weight assigned to the own decision can be compared
to the weight given to any other subject’s decision. Hence, in the absence of information
concerning other subjects’ decisions, the falsity of a present consensus effect cannot be
decided.
An alternative way is to compare the given estimates to those that would be optimal
estimates based on Bayesian updating of a reasonable prior belief. Since it is difﬁcult to
justify a particular prior belief, usually a uniform prior belief is chosen (see Dawes, 1989).
AnestimateofmoreconsensusthanjustiﬁedbyBayesianupdatingwouldthenbeconsidered
an indication of a false consensus effect.
However, the assumption of a uniform prior belief (as that of any particular prior belief)
is of course arbitrary. On the other hand we consider the only reasonable alternative form of
priorbeliefstobeunimodal.Suchapriorbeliefwouldhaveasmallervariancethanauniform
prior belief and would therefore be more robust to updating. Hence Bayesian updating of
such a prior belief would result in a lower difference between the optimal estimates ofTHE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 253
A-subjects and B-subjects. Thus a false consensus effect could be considered present if the
observed difference is larger than that between optimal estimates for a uniform prior.
Several problems remain with this approach. First of all, it is not necessarily a sign of
overweighting of the own decision if too extreme updating is observed. It could simply be
that subjects give too much weight to any information about a single choice and this would
thus simply indicate an inability to carry out Bayesian updating but not that subjects give
special attention to a decision just because it is their own.10 Second, with our incentive
system, for a uniform prior no overweighting is possible.11 To maximize the expected
payoff, subjects have to maximize the probability of an exact hit and should hence give the
mode of the posterior belief as the estimate. Under the assumption of a uniform prior belief
the mode of the posterior belief is either all A or no A, depending on the own decisions.12
Thus already optimal weighting leads to extreme estimates. Furthermore, this approach
would not allow to detect underweighting of the own decision. If the difference between
the estimates of A-subjects and B-subjects is smaller than that between optimal estimates
for a uniform prior, this could always be explained by a prior with smaller variance.
The fact that the four items from the category “morally relevant” are among those ﬁve
items with the strongest consensus effect might be considered as support for the hypothesis
that a possible false consensus effect has an ego-defensive function. However, this effect is
very small for the items from the same category for which we provided information. The
consensus effect for the items which are payoff-relevant is on average stronger than that
of those which are not. This contradicts the hypothesis that the consensus effect is, in fact,
an adaptation effect which would imply that it would decrease if incentives for the true
revelation of preferences are provided. The results for the items with information are along
the same line in this respect.
4. Concluding remarks
Our study was designed to provide an easy test for a (truly) false consensus effect and to
overcome the shortcomings of previous studies by providing clear monetary incentives for
the revelation of true beliefs.
It indicates that, given both these incentives and representative information, although
subjects show a consensus effect, they show no false consensus effect. They signiﬁcantly
underweight,notoverweight,theirowndecisioncomparedtotherepresentativeinformation
we provided. This primary result has qualitatively been replicated by A. Ortmann and
R. Hertwig who used an adaptation of our design in an experiment at Bowdoin College in
December1998.Theresultsalsoﬁttheanswerstothequestionnairesthatsubjectscompleted
after the experiment.13
Thus the false consensus effect might not be very relevant for economic applications.
Plainly,itcouldevenbearesultofbaddeﬁnition.However,thisconclusionmightholdonly
for the type of information we provide, namely explicit information without uncertainty.
Wedonotknowwhattheresultswouldbelikeiftheinformationwereimplicit,forexample
if subjects observed the behavior of other subjects in repeated games, but did not receive
a list of others’ decisions. In this case, it might happen that subjects overweight their own
decisions because of problems in keeping track of others’ behavior. This situation may be
more relevant to economics since, in reality, people often have the opportunity to observe254 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL
other people’s behavior but do not receive a list of what they did. Certainly this is an area
for future research.
Offerman et al. (1996) provided such implicit information and did not ﬁnd a false con-
sensus effect. They conducted a public good experiment and did not ﬁnd any systematic
difference between players and spectators. Hence, the own decision is not weighted more
than the information about other subjects. Offerman et al. did not even ﬁnd a consensus
effect in the sense that cooperators and individualists did not differ in their estimates of
cooperation rates. However, this result has to be treated with care, since they did not con-
trol for the information the subjects received. Given their ﬁnite subject set in each session,
cooperators on average met fewer cooperators than individualists did. Hence the equality
of the estimates of cooperation rates means that, if subjects used the information at all, they
also gave some weight to their own decisions. So there is a consensus effect. The results
of Offerman et al. are in line with ours in the sense that there is a consensus effect, but no
false consensus effect.14
Concerning the rounds where we did not provide any information, we believe that we
cannot decide whether the consensus effect we ﬁnd is a false consensus effect. Even if one
can overcome the problem to measure prior beliefs, examining the false consensus effect in
the absence of other information does not seem to be a very promising idea. As noted in the
introduction, we believe that it does not even make much sense to deﬁne a false consensus
effect without reference to other information. Only if a possible overweighting of the own
decision is detected compared to other information can this be traced to giving a special
role to the self and not just to any available information.
Appendix A
Experimental protocol
The experiment was conducted at Humboldt-Universit¨ at zu Berlin. Subjects where invited
to register for an experiment through posters and announcements in classes. When subjects
came to the computer pool arranged they were randomly placed at separated, isolated
computer terminals. They received written instructions (see Appendix B) for which they
could ask for clariﬁcation. They then played the sequence of Decide, Receive information,
and Estimate for 16 different items (see Appendix C) without any feedback about their hit
rate. After this they had to ﬁll in a questionnaire before getting feedback about their hit rate
and payoff. Finally, they were paid according to their number of hits and their decisions
about donations, form and time of payoff.15
Appendix B
Translated instructions
Welcome to our experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have
any difﬁculty in understanding, do not ask for help out loud, just raise your hand. We willTHE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 255
then answer your questions privately. Please stop communicating with other participants
from now on.
YouwillgetashowupfeeofDM10.-foryourparticipation.Youcangainorloseadditional
money during the experiment. You will end up with a positive amount in any case.
The experiment consists of 16 rounds. In each of these rounds you have to make two
decisions. First you have to choose between two alternatives (Decision 1). Simply click the
relevant button to make your choice.
NextyourtaskistoestimatehowelevenothersubjectsdecidedinDecision1(Decision2).
Those eleven subjects are randomly picked from the participants, independently for every
participantandround.Youwillnotknowwhothesepeopleare.Pleasechooseadistribution
by clicking the relevant ﬁeld. The upper number in each ﬁeld means the number of subjects
who have chosen alternative A. The lower number means the number of subjects who have
chosen Alternative B.
For example, if you expect that two out of eleven subjects have chosen h Alternative A i
and nine have chosen h Alternative B i then click the ﬁeld:
2
9
In some rounds you will receive some information before making Decision 2. You will
be informed about how four other participants decided in Decision 1. (You do not have to
estimate Decision 1 for any of them.)256 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL
These four subjects will also be randomly picked independently for every participant
and round. Your own decision will not be included. You will not know about whom you
received information. Other participants might receive information about your decision but
in this case they will not know you were the decision maker.
Your actual payoff will be determined as follows: The number of correct estimates in
Decision 2 determines your raw payoff. It consists of DM 10.- showup fee and DM 4.- for
every correct estimate (hit). You will not receive any information about your hit rate or your
current raw payoff during the experiment.
Some of the Decisions 1 have an effect on the size and form of your raw payoff. There
aresometransferdecisionswhichgovernhowyourrawpayoffisconvertedintoyouractual
payoff. As well, there are some decisions which govern the form of your payment. Hence,
your payoff results according to the following scheme. This may look complicated at ﬁrst,
but it will become clear during the experiment.
Please keep the sheet with your subject-id. Without it you won’t receive any payment.
Appendix C
Items
Fruit: What do you eat more frequently, Oranges or Bananas?
Oranges Bananas
Free-riding Do you occasionally free-ride on public transport?
No YesTHE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 257
Payoff System: You can change the payoff system (up to now DM 10.- showup fee and
DM 4.- per hit) and receive DM 5.- showup fee and DM 6.- per hit. Do you want to
change?
Keep current system Change
Public Good:YoucaninvestDM1.-ofyourpayoffinasharedfund.ForeachDMinvested
every participant will receive DM 0.25.
I invest DM 1.- I do not invest
Tax Evasion:Supposeyouhaveanewwashingmachinedelivered.Thedeliverymanoffers
not to bill you for the sales tax if you go without a receipt. Do you accept this offer of
tax evasion?
I accept I do not accept
Rich-Poor: If you are the one with the highest raw payoff, will you give away DM 2.- to
the one with the lowest raw payoff?
I give away DM 2.- I do not give away anything
Lottery: You can take part in a lottery. Your payoff is then no longer determined by the
hits in all rounds but we will randomly draw one round which is paid out 16 times. The
showup fee remains the same.
I take part in the lottery I do not take part
Writing: What do you use more frequently, pencil or pen?
Pencil Pen
Donation ai: You can donate DM 1.- of your raw payoff to amnesty international. For
every DM donated the experimenters will donate an additional DM 1.-. This donation
will be deducted from your raw payoff.
I do not donate I donate DM 1.-
Time Preference: You can receive your payoff immediately after the experiment or you
can get your payoff plus 10% interest after one month. Do you want your payoff now or
later?
Now Later
Elevator: If there is an elevator, do you use it for going to the third ﬂoor or do you take the
stairs?
Stairs Elevator258 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL
Exam: Do you allow neighbors who are unknown to you to copy from you in exams?
No Yes
Months: Which month do you prefer for holidays, March or October?
October March
Stamps: You can receive your payoff either in cash or in stamps. If you choose stamps you
receive one stamp worth DM 1.10 for every DM of your payoff. We round up to entire
stamps. What do you prefer?
Cash Stamps
Donation Chapel: You can donate DM 1.- of your raw payoff to the reconstruction of the
Heiliggeist Chapel. For every DM donated the experimenters will donate an additional
DM 1.-. This donation will be deducted from your raw payoff.
I donate DM 1.- I do not donate
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Notes
1. See for example Selten and Ockenfels (1998) or Jacobsen and Sadrieh (1996).
2. Forexample,inthestudybyRossetal.(1997)subjectswereaskedtowalkaroundcampuswearingasandwich
board saying “Repent”. Those who agreed estimated that 63.5% of their peers would do so, while those who
refused expected only 23.3% to agree.
3. The inclusion of a false consensus effect in game theoretic models can yield interesting insights and results
(see e.g. Engelmann, 2000, chapter 4).
4. The disappearance of other cognitive illusions that are important in economics is investigated in Gigerenzer
et al. (in press).
5. That the number of subjects equals the number of rounds is a mere coincidence and of no signiﬁcance to the
experiment.
6. Participants could choose to get their payoff in stamps. If they did, we counted the cash equivalent of the
stamps, which was DM 1.10.THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT 259
7. To subjects, options always were named by an abbreviation of the respective meaning (see Appendix C), not
by these labels.
8. Although we are aware of the fact that we cannot legitimately treat the different items in one session as
independent,itisillustrativetoignorethisproblem.Ifweconsideredeachitemineachsessionasindependent
observation and deﬁned hits as above, we would obtain 31 out of possible 40 (eight items times ﬁve sessions)
hits. This would allow the hypothesis that there is no consensus effect to be rejected at a 0.5%-level.
9. Thereisnonotablegenderdifferencewithrespecttoeithertheconsensusorfalseconsensuseffects.Compared
to Economics and business students other subjects showed less underweighting but also no false consensus.
10. In awareness of this possibility Alicke and Largo (1995) designed an experiment to compare the weight of the
own decision with information about other subjects. Their design is similar to ours in that they also provide
information about four other subjects. They ﬁnd a (truly) false consensus effect, but, in contrast to our study,
their items were performance tests. Conceptionally, this is very different, since the background information
concerning performance tests in a familiar area (psychology students had to take a test in personality assess-
ment) is much broader than that of preferences regarding unfamiliar choices. Usually subjects have some
reasonable belief about their relative performance and thus information about their success is much more
informative than information about the success of a randomly chosen subject. Hence, in this context, it can
be perfectly rational to assign greater weight to the own success or failure than to that of another subject.
11. One could consider this as a defect of our incentive scheme. However, since our focus was on the items with
information, we preferred an easy incentive scheme over one that would have allowed to detect overweighting
in principle, given the problems with this approach.
12. Given a uniform prior over the probability p for a choice of A, the posterior probability for t A’s out of m
observations after observing 1 A in 1 observation is given by 2
R 1
0 ptC1.1 ¡ p/m¡t.
m
t /dp D 2.t C1/
.mC1/.m C 2/;
which is maximal for t D m:
13. Mostsubjectsstatedthattheyusedtheirownchoicetoadaptestimatestheyhadformedbasedontheinformation
given. This process may have led to an underweighting of the own decision. Subjects seemed to be uncertain
abouthowtoweighttheowndecision,althoughtheywereawarethattheyshouldconsideritsomehow(except
for two subjects who stated explicitly that they had information not just about four subjects’ decisions but
about ﬁve, including themselves). Concerning the rounds without information, the majority of subjects stated
that they based their expectations on their own decision, which is clearly in line with the observed consensus
effect.
14. Inourexperiment,however,apublicgoodgamehadthestrongestconsensuseffectamongtheitemsforwhich
we did not provide any information.
15. Subjects on average dramatically overestimated their hit rate. The average estimated hit rate was 28.9%,
whereas the average actual hit rate was 11.56% (only slightly above the expected hit rate of pure guessing
1
12 ¼ 8:33%). Although the subjects used the provided information in a reasonable way surprinsingly the
actual hit rate for the items without information was slightly better than for the items with information (77
vs. 71 out of 640 possible hits).
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